Land problems in French Polynesia by Ravault, François
Land Problems in 
French Polynesia 
FRANCOIS RAVAULT ) 
A land tenure system exists within 
a legal and social framework - social 
organisation, methods of individual and . 
collective land appropriation, and land 
laws derived from them. Any economic 
system allows for some adjustment in the 
demand for land according to availability, 
and conditioned by economic, social and 
political forces. 
To what extent is the land system in 
French Polynesia responsible for the state 
of its agriculture? What characteristics 
should it have to facilitate the agricultural 
development planned by the local govern- 
ment? Before answering- these questions, 
it is necessary to understand the history 
of land policy starting from the break 
with the past made by the proclamation 
of the French Civil Code at the end of the 
last century. 
I am deeply grateful to the High Com- 
mis s ione r ,  Pau l  Cousseran, who in- 
troduced m e  to this subject from l$ own 
ekperience. I have also a deep intellectual 
debt to all those jurists and social science 
researchers, especially R. Calinaüd and 
P. Ottino, who have contributed to a 
knowledge and solution of land problems 
in French Polynesia. 
His tor ica l  Background to Land and 
Estates 
A hundred years after France an- 
nexed t h e  Pomare  Kingdom and its 
dependencies in 1880, and more than 
thirty years after the suppression in 1945 
of the codified laws and native juriSdic- 
tion of the  Leeward Islands, Rurutu and 
- 
Rimatara the legal land system of the 
territory is that of the French Civil Code. 
But there  are still used two methods of 
appropriation, individual and joint owner- 
ship, which are incompatible with the 
spirit and letter of French law. 
Almost all usable land in the residen- 
tial zone in Tahiti, Mahina to Paea, with 
the exception of a few enclaves of former 
Polynesian dwellings, is individually 
owned; as is much of the southern coast 
of Tahiti and a few sectors of the penin- 
sula, especially rural  districts with a 
heavy proportion of inhabitants of mixed 
r a c e  ídemis). such  as P a p a r a  and 
Afaahiti; islands of tourist resorts such as 
Moorea and Bora Bora; much of Raiatea, 
Tahaa ,  and even to a lesser degree 
Tubuai, certain atolls of the Tuamotu ar- 
chipelago, and several of the Marquesas 
Islands. Land is owned jointly almost 
e v e r y w h e r e  else .  I n  t h e  outer ar- 
chipelagoes, particularly Raiatea-Tahaa, 
although joint ownership does not cover 
most private property, does affect prac- 
tically all native islanders. 
How were individual and joint owner- 
ship established in French Polynesia? 
"When, in 1842, France established its 
Protectorate on the Kingdom of Tahiti. . . 
land holdings were regulated by non-codified 
customs . . . an individual had no written 
deed to guarantee his rights. the actual oc- 
cupation of the land being. in general.'the 
source and proof of such rights. It was im- 
perative that some order be made in this em- 
ptiness. '' (Bonneau, 1965, p.3). 
.- 
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Apart from a concern for legal order, 
the Protectorate and then the .Colony 
authorities were also responding to the 
economic context of the second half of the 
19th century particularly the demand 
from industrialised countries for oils by 
trying to encourage land settlement for 
coconut plantations. To do this it seemed 
’ necessary to give Polynesians, who con- 
sidered the land an inalienable family 
right, individual ownership. This was done 
by supplying them with deeds of owner- 
ship which could serve as a legal basis for 
property- transactions. At  the -same. .time 
the administration set up the French mor- 
tgage  sys tem and began registering 
property rights and their holders without 
surveying the land itself. The Tahitian 
Law of 1852, established a procedure for 
the  declaration of land titles and a 
register in which was to be recorded, on 
the declaration of the occupant, the name, 
owners, limits and approximate capacities 
of every property. 
Though the system was simplified it 
was not acceptable to the subjects of the 
two last sovereigns of Tahiti. It was 
\ therefore  necessary to wait for an- 
nexation, and the decree of 24 August 
1887, which, in o r d e r  to encourage 
claim ants to come forward. stipulated 
that any undeclared land would become 
public property. With a few variations and 
improvements, especially in the Leeward 
Islands (annexed in 18981, this procedure 
was  gradually extended to the entire 
Colony, although it was not until 1920-25 
that it was applied to the east of the 
Tuamotu archipelago, and 1945 to Rapa, 
The results of this policy were disap- 
pointing, although its essential socio- 
economic goals were reached. 
“Delivered on the simple declaration 
of the parties concerned, with no serious 
control in the field . . .” (Bonneau, 1965, 
’ Rurutu and Rimatara. 
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i p.6) the  deeds do not always offer sound guarantees as to the limits and capacities 
of the properties, nor for the identification 
of the -owners. At the same time that 
o w n e r s h i p  dec lara t ions  were being 
registered, a systematic survey of all par- 
cels of land should have been carried out. 
Public surveys, after a timid beginning 
under the Second Empire, were aban- 
doned in 1906 when a hurricane destroyed 
the first documents. They began again 
following the proclamation of the decree 
of 9 August 1927. At present, surveys are 
still -unfinisheds for the southern-group of -- 
the Marquesas and in the Tuamotu ar- 
chipelago, and should be updated. In view 
of Polynesian customs regarding tran- 
smission of names and lines of descendan-. 
ts, the precise identification of owners 
required qualified staff which did not 
exist at the time, and meticulous methods 
which were never uséd. Instead, a card 
index is kept of claims which were gran- 
ted. 
The  administration granted many 
deeds between 1852 and 1930, and for 
many claimants they are, even today, the 
sole legal proof of ownership. However, 
the goal of increasing individud owner- 
ship has not been attained. Certainly 
many people claimed land in their per- 
s o n a l  n a m e ,  b u t  i n  t h e  following 
generation many of these properties, in- 
stead of being subdivided, have become 
the joint property of the heirs. Other 
people, particularly in the Leeward Islan- 
ds, m a d e  joint declarations and now 
therefore find themselves joint owners. 
The deficient deeds and the rapid 
growth of joint ownership did not however 
hinder the sudden increase in land tran- 
sactions during the first decades of this 
century. 
“The main fact of agrarian history in 
t h e  2 0 t h  c e n t u r y ,  I h a v e  w r i t t e n  
.elsewhere, is this stupendous transfer of 
rights which allowed for ’the establish- 
ment  of white and part-white owned 
8 
. 
properties to the detriment of the native 
properties which were reduced to minimal 
proportions”: (Ravault, 1972, p.23). A 
number of factors made this transfer 
possible. With subsistence agriculture, 
population increased slowly and there was 
little pressure on the land. 
*A number of sales contracts were am- 
biguous : the  purchasers  bought the 
ownership rights defined in the Civil Code 
whereas the sellers believed they were 
selling only the right of use. 
There was systematic recourse to sale 
by auctioa- and sale -with-option-to-repur- -. .= 
chase, which obliged the recalcitrant joint 
owners to  transfer their rights. The com- 
mon use a t  that time of sales by auction 
e x p l a i n s  why t h e  problem of joint  
possession was not a great obstacle to the 
establishment of estates owned by the 
whites or  halfcastes. It was quite easy to 
purchase shares in joint-owned properties 
from owners who lived there and were not 
making use of their land, or who did not 
live there, and then to ask the court to 
make allocations and to purchase the 
remaining shares through the court. 
Until 1934 there was no control on 
property transfers between individuals. 
Individual ownership was encouraged 
by the  establishment of coconut plan- 
tations,  which came to dominate the 
coastal plains, and the development of 
other exportable crops such as coffee and 
vanilla, which occupy available ground in 
the major  river valleys and slopes. The 
i n i t i a t i v e  c a m e  f r o m  t h e  popaa 
(whitemen) and demi (part-whites), but 
Polynesians with cash needs followed the 
trend and neglected food crops, which by 
then were grown mainly on hilly ground 
which rapidly deteriorated. Stimulated by 
almost constant price increases until 1928, 
copra production increased rapidly. 
Individual ownership was also en- 
couraged by the concealed opposition bet- 
ween a middle-class, mainly of demis, who 
kept their links with the land but lived 
mostly in the city on the income earned 
by investing the profits of agriculture in 
business enterprises, and the majority of 
rural dwellers, who were dispossessed of 
most of their land inheritance and lived 
on the pittance they gathered from the 
cash economy. 
The period of economic dynamism 
and social differentiation, in which the 
Civil Code was instrumental, was followed 
between 1930 and 1960 by three decades 
marked not only by stabilisation of land 
ownership, but also by a growing socio- 
economic-srisis. - 
Joint ownership, the complexjty of 
which has increased from one generation 
to the next, increased considerably. In 
Papeari during the thirties only 20% of 
the land in the district remained under 
joint ownership. In 1968, this proportion 
was slightly above 50%. Joint possession 
involved not only the original families 
who never divided their lagds, but also 
the descendants of immigrants’of mixed 
race  who settled locally and became 
culturally assimilated. 
This situation appears to be linked 
more to overall economic development 
than to the administration’s land policies. 
Between 1930 and 1960, the administration 
continued to create conditions favourable 
to individual ownership by facilitating 
allocations, by attempting to avoid an ex- 
cessive break-up of properties while 
carrying out the land survey, by creating 
a Department of Lands, and by setting up 
a genealogical index system open to the 
public. Against this tendency, in order to 
protect “native” property, by the decree 
of 25 J u n e  1934 the  administration 
required all real estate transfers between 
living parties to be officially authorised. 
This inhibited the acquisition of land by 
Chinese and other foreigners. . 
During this period there was a clear 
decrease in real estate transactions. But 
in rea l i ty ,  it was the  overall socio- 
economic situation rather than the decree 
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p r o t e c t i n g  “na t ive”  property tha t  
discouraged such dealings. There were no 
more coconuts‘left to plant except in the 
Tuamotu Islands. The Polynesians, who 
had become distrustful, were no longer 
sellers and, above all, the rural economy 
of the French in Oceania was approaching 
a crisis, Copra production, which had in- 
c reased  rapidly until  1936, gradually 
stabilized. Prices, continued to decrease 
between 1929 and 1941, and reached their 
highest level at the end of the second 
world war,  but between 1948 and 1960 the 
average FOB price, levelled at about 26 
francs: * A t  the -same -time,--between 1948 
and 1962, the cost of living index In- 
creased by approximately 70 points, and 
the annual population increase (2.5% bet- 
ween 1931 and 1946) rose to 3.3% 
Agriculture in the Territory was in 
crisis. From 1955 onwards, large numbers 
of Polynesians, no longer able to continue 
living from agriculture, migrated to New 
Caledonia. The descendants of the land- 
owners who -created the plantations still 
received their annual ground rents but no 
longer invested them. Inspector General 
Guillaume noted that from 1956 onwards, 
\ people speculated on the unearned in- 
crements expected from the development 
of the residential areas and city zones in 
response to the increase in. tourism, 
which, in Tahiti, gave rise to a substantial 
overestimation of land assets. 
Specialists (agronomists, lawyers) 
hovered a t  the bedside of the sick child. A 
project for the revival and diversification 
of agriculture, a “commission for the im- 
provement of the land system” chaired by 
a magis t ra te ,  proposed measures t o  
promote the joint ownership of land, but 
their report was not considered by the 
Ter r i to r ia l  Assembly or the Central 
Parliament. A start was made on the im- 
plementation of plans for revival but the 
advent of the Centre d’Experimentation 
du Pacific (Atomic Testing’Centre for the 




Over only a few years, the entir’ 
structure of the economy had been over- 
turned. The traditional export economy >?! 
was replaced by an economy of services . 
. . which was also an economy of salaries. 
The rapid growth. of the employment and 
salaries.  increases caused the decline of 
the traditional export crops. In the Wind- 
ward Islands in particular, although there 
was still a preoccupation with agriculture, 
there was a progressive adaptation of 
production to the ever-increasing needs of 
the local market. 
points clear. Firstly, the vigorous increase 
of individual ownership was related to the 
dynamism and interests of the middle 
class. A t  the end of the 19th century and 
the beginning of the 20th century, the 
Civil Code was the legal instrument for 
the  establishment of an  economy of 
agricultural exports and the importation 
of manufactured products, a simple trade 
economy of colonial exploitation. This 
economy was successful between the . 
wars, but it -collapsed after 1945 with the . 
deterioration of trading terms and the in- 
crease of population. In the context of an 
economy of salaries and services, in- 
d iv idua l  ownership rarely served to 
promote agriculture. On the other hand, 
the land as an  object of speculation 
allowed the  land owners, a t  least in 
Tahiti, to make easy money and the new 
middle class (civil servants, merchants, 
members of the liberal professions) to 
make potentially lucrative investments. 
Secondly, in contrast, joint possession 
which Consolidated positions in the rural 
area and especially in the outer ar-  
chipelagoes appeared to be not only a 
relic of the  past, but also a reaction to 
dispossession and an adaptation by the 
Polynesians to an economy in turmoil 
combined with an increasing population. 
It iq interesting to nbte that it developed 
considerably between 1938 and 1960, after 
the great  era of real estate dealings. 
This ~-historical..summary-makes -two ~ 
II The Land Tenure System 
Individual ownership and joint owner- 
ship fit into very different contexts. The 
. land tenure system of the Civil Code is 
well known. The problem stems from joint 
possession which leads to indirect forms 
and rights of land use by the owners, 
’ g o v e r n e d ,  i n  t h e  absence  of c l e a r  
regulations, by customary practices. 
Joint Ownership 
In a territory where the French Civil 
Code has  the force of law throughout, 
joint ownership raises certain questions. 
Is it the  mere total of “combined in- 
dividual properties” a s  affirmed by 
several jurists who refer to the concept of 
absolute property rights as contained in 
the Civil Code? It would then be charac- 
terised “from a socio-economic point of 
view of . . . by anarchy, insecurity and 
under-development” (Calinaud, 1976, p.3). 
Or is “true collective property used to at- 
tain a common goal”? These are fun- 
damental questions, for over and above 
any legal appearances, they establish the 
problem of the origin and nature of the 
land tenure systems in French Polynesia. 
Can joint possession be considered merely 
as a “local” deviation of the Civil Code, 
or is it the expression of a specific land 
tenure system? Before proposing my own 
analysis, I would like briefly to consider 
the arguments of holders of the classic 
line of thought. 
The Classical Interpretation * 
For those decreasing numbers who do 
not doubt the universal value of the prin- 
ciples contained in the Civil Code, joint 
possession is merely a matter of technical 
problems. A magistrate, without sub- 
scribing to the opinion, sums up their 
arguments in the following manner: 
The scattering of the Territory, the 
difficulty of establishing the rights of 
everyone, the minimum costs entailed 
*. .. 
. _  
by any procedure, t..e necess,,y to 
have recourse to a land surveyor and 
an estate specialist, the indolence of 
the natives, interfere with allótments. 
(Bonneau, 1965, pp.8-9). 
This analysis is based on facts which 
,.-should .not be .undervalued, but it fails 
completely to take into account the socio- 
economic and cultural context of the 
problems relating to land estates. It is 
perhaps necessary to point out that: ’ 
o 
o 
the Polynesians for a long time 
rejected the procedure of the tomite 
before ,adhering’ to it and thus . 
making a break with the past (see 
P anoff, 1966 1. 
the administration’s policy, which 
had followed this principle until 
1960, failed during the crisis in the 
colonial economy; 
the spectacular reduction of joint 
ownership over the last 15 years in 
the Leeward Islands, and in par- 
ticular on Tahiti; followed social 
and economic change, proof that 
the technical obstacles hindering 
the allocation process are not in- 
surmount able ; 
on joint ownership, the  ru ra l  
Polynesian areas and especially in 
the outer archipelagoes is linked to 
an economic, social and cultural 
envi ronment  which has  been 
relatively preserved. 
Should this classical interpretation of 
joint ownership then be rejected out of 
hand? Of course not, for in’ the islands 
which have been the most affected by ac- 
culturation, in particular the Society and 
western Tuamotu Islands, the kaditional 
basis of customary law has been severely 
jolted. Although this does not mean that 
all land owners wish to change from joint 




Customary Law ’ 
Although in all the archipelagoes I 
worked in, customary law is based on cer- 
tain common principles, the operation of 
the land tenure system is not always 
satisfactory. 
Precisely this inefficiency feeds the 
, arguments of those who see joint owner- 
ship only as the’  result of a poor ap- 
plication of the French system. 
The goals of the land tenure system 
Property documents (for example, the 
. tomite and c o r r e s p o n ~ n g - s u r v - ~ ~ ) ,  
and d a t a  re la t ing t o  land use ( the 
allocation of plots for different types of 
c u l t i v a t i o n  a n d  r e a r i n g ) ,  show a 
discrepancy between the very general 
nature of appropriation of fenua (land) by 
groups  of re la t ives  descended from 
titleholders, and the very precise nature 
of p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  re la t ing  t o  the  
cultivation of plantations. The latter may 
be collective (in the case of coconut or 
coffee plantations), but in practice are 
almost always individual, in regard for in- 
stance to copra pr.oduced on a joint-owned 
\ coconut  plantation. In  the complex 
cultivation arrangements quite frequent in 
the Society Islands, a superimposition of 
rights on a single parcel of land can result 
in the allocation of various types of 
cultivation to different farmers. For in- 
stance, one can find a coconut plantation 
worked by the various members of one 
family group, while under the trees, 
bananas and taro are grown by other who 
hold rights. Except when the plantations 
are  very old and the original planters 
have been forgotten (on coconut and less 
frequently coffee plantations), farmers 
almost always justify their rights by 
referring to two categories of complemen- 
tary events: to the action of having plan- 
ted the crops, attributed to them or their 
ancestors, or to a “deed” (for want of a 
better word) written or not, copied or not, 
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which indicates the allocation of land !\ 7 
the result of a claim, a partition, the sim- 
ple fact  of occupation: a will, or indeed its’l, 
purchase. 
All these .factors, which were ap- 
parent in all the islands I visited, prove 
that for Polynesians there is a fundamen- 
tal  distinction between what I will call 
collective control of the land (@wu), 
which is the prerogative of the descen- 
dants of the beneficiary of the original 
deed of allocation, and effective rights in 
the plantations held jointiy or individually 
by the  cultivators themselves or their 
heirs, - 
This  phenomenrin, which can be 
associated with ä division of ownership, 
furnishes proof that the Polynesian con- 
cept of ownership as it is still firmly held 
is hardly compatible with that contained 
in the Civil Code as it is almost always in- 
terpreted in French Polynesia. What is 
the significance of this division? 
In distinguishing two categories of 
land rights which correspond to two levels 
of appropriation, the Polynesians are  
evidently attempting to fulfil two different 
goals. There is no ambiguity about the 
second. Effective rights to the plantations 
allows people to satisfy the needs of the 
basic family units. With the development 
of a cash economy, these have become 
the cells of a consumer society, even in 
the most distant islands. No doubt there 
has been an adaptation of customs here, 
for it appears that agricultural work used 
to be carried out collectively by the mem- 
bers of an extended family under the 
authority of the head of that family, who 
would then distribute thc harvest between 
the basic family units. 
The  ethnologist Ottino (1971) has 
irrefutably demonstratcd in his study on 
Rangiroa (the reach of which goes well 
beyond the context of the islands of the 
western zone of the Tuamotus), not that 
land has’  a social value,  which was 
something already known (Panoff, 1970; 
Finney, 1973; Hanson, 19731, but how it 
has preserved that value. 
“In spite of the new economic con- 
ditions which radically modified the 
inter-relationship of generation and 
production, and made the conjugal 
family emerge a t  the centre of the ex- 
tended family unit, the  principles for- 
m i n g  the  bas i s  of  the  extended 
family” continue to  determine the 
ï d e a s  a n d  b e h a v i o u r  of t h e  
Polynesians. What a r e  these? 
The undifferentiated character of the 
s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  a l l o w s  a n y o n e  
theoretically to be “related to one’s father 
and mother; one’s four  grandparents, 
eight great-grandparents”, and could to 
unspeakable confusion of parental and 
marital  ties to the extent that almost 
anyone may be a fif i i  with “the quasi- 
totality of the other inhabitants of the 
village and the atoll”, and many more 
islands too. Ottino demonstrates however 
that the  various groups of relatives foun- 
d e d  b y  descen t  “ h a v e  a concrete 
existence only insofar as they coincide 
with one or more territorial units . . . 
The collective control of land (joint 
ownership according to the Civil Code) 
and effective rights in it depend on the 
conditions of residence and a nucleus of 
residents cultivating the family property. 
Land ownership is therefore a deter- 
mining factor, of kinship: inherited land 
guarantees the perpetuity of the family 
unit, but territorial security can only be 
assured, in the context of residence, by 
actual use of one’s land rights. 
The socio-geographical basis of custom 
Under customary law, to be a jatu 
(owner) in the widest possible sense of the 
term,  one must be a taata tutnu: one must 
have family roots in the area. That status 
is acquired in two ways. 
It is necessary t o  be a member 
through one’s father and/or mother of a 
Y ,  
lineage issuing from a common ancestor 
originating in a particular district or 
i s l a n d ,  w h o  m a y  w e l l  be  m a n y  
generations back in time. But this con- 
dition in itself is not sufficient. One must 
also be integrated into one and/or the 
other of two social categories which are 
really .localised segments of the vast 
social group formed by the descendants of 
that particular ancestor. Briefly, these 
categories are the restricted opuhoe which 
groups together very close relations . . . 
who a r e  full, consanguine, uterine, or 
sometimes adopted brothers and sisters, 
who have been raised together, and the 
extended o p  hoe whieh is a group of.close. r. 
r e la t ives  descended from the initial 
restricted group of brothers and sisters 
and the  following generations, that of the 
children and the grandchildren. 
The opu fetii is a category which can 
be defined as a former relative, more 
likely to be dead than .living who gave 
birth to a group of now elderly brothers 
and sisters, represented by at least one 
surviving person, who forms the main 
element of an extended opu hoe. This an- 
cestor is often at the base of the property 
rights. 
In order to understand the mechanics 
of transmission of property rights it is im- 
portant to point out that these social 
categories a re  not frozen. “With the 
passage of time and the disappearance of 
the preceeding generations” (Ottino) (see 
fig. 31, the extended opu hoe is dissolved 
by the death of the last representative of 
the initial group of siblings. As many 
restricted opu hoe groups then come into 
existence as there are  families of first 
generation descendants in that group. To 
these groups are added the following 
generations, so they in turn become the 
head elements of new extended opu hoe. 
The reference to a common ancestor, 
and t h e  fact  tha t  one belongs to a 
localised group of relations, has a precise 
meaning that I would like to’show while 
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, analysing traditional family trees which 
are t h e  basis for proof of ownership. 
rights. Genealogical t rees  to which lists of 
land have  been annexed, the paruu tutu 
(customary wills) a re  transcribed in the 
puta tupunu (book of the ancestors) which 
are kept by the family heads. In the past, 
a t  least for the Tuamotus, this preser- 
. vation was  ensured by the district coun- 
cils which kept them available for those 
under their jurisdiction. In Rurutu and 
R i m a t a r a  up until 1945, genealogical 
knowledge was  in the  hands of the 
speakers representing the main family 
units who would intervene particularly in 
land matters, in local customary jurisdic- 
tions. These genealogies allow a person to 
examine his origins by direct or any other 
line back to the common founding an- 
cestor at the base of the rights; and to 
prove in the same way that he belongs to 
a “residential line”, the continuity of 
which is ensured from generation to 
. generation only by the descendants of those 
persons who are considered as residents. 
T h e s e  lists of names show quite 
clearly that  the descendants of people who 
h a v e  s e t t l e d  elsewhere,  following a 
\ marriage or adoption, are never men- 
tioned if the  absence is longer than two or 
three generations. Elderly people do not 
know or have no wish to know their 
relatives living elsewhere descended, for 
instance, from a brother or sister of one 
of their ancestors who travelled to other 
areas. They consider that those absent 
are incapable of belonging to one or other 
of t h e  l o c a l i s e d  s o c i a l  categories 
described earlier, that  they have broken 
off their  family ties and, which comes to 
the s a m e  thing, have automatically for- 
feited their  land rights. In this way, they 
‘ are  simply reaffirming the principle of 
collective appropriation of the land - the 
qualification of tuuta tumu applied to a 
group and not an individual. And they im- 
plicitly put limits on the socio-temporal 




two or three generations - in which eff&\ 
tive property rights can be exercised. Th 
relevant span is that of the extended o& 
hoe. which is hardly surprising since un-;, 
der customary law, the normal operation 
of the  land tenure system implies the 
existence of a powerful control and com- 
munity spirit .which can work effectively 
only a t  the level of coherent family 
groups. 
The quality of tuntutumu which con- 
fers “potential ownership” requires two 
conditions: a common ancestor as the 
basis of the right, and membership of a 
local group determined both by residence 
and by descent allows a person to make 
use of the right. 
Patrilineal estates and land groups 
In all the islands where customs have 
been preserved, it is easy to identify the 
depth and spread of groups who control 
the  l and  by counting the number of 
g e n e r a t i o n s  b e t w e e n  t h e  p r e s e n t  
inhabitants and the people who, according 
to them, are at  the origin of their rights. 
I n  T a t a k o t o ,  i n  e a s t e r n  T u a m o t u  
(Ravault ,  1978, p.57), referring to the 
tomite of 1903 and 1919, it is noticeable 
that, if several of the titleholders are still 
alive, most of the present claimants are 
the children, grandchildren, and even the 
great-grandchildren (hina) of the original 
c l a iman t s .  They a r e  therefore close 
re la t ives  or very close relatives. In 
Rurutu, an island where the land survey, 
m a d e  f rom 1950 onwards,  caused a 
g e n e r a l i s e d  pa r t i t i on  of lands  (De 
Bisschop, 1952), the land groupings are, as 
a rule, even more restricted. In the con- 
text of these groupings, the way property 
is transmitted varies according to the 
land tenure system, and must be under- 
stood before analysing the rules governing 
access to the land. 
For the Civil Code, groups of joint co- 
owners a re  made up of all “qualified” 
descendants (those with legal capacity 
’ 
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whose numbers  inc rease  with every 
generation) of a common ancestor who 
was allocated the  t i t le to a specific 
property. A person may therefore belong 
to several  joint ownerships spread out 
territorially, and his or her property 
r ights  i n  the abstract  shares in the 
property concerned cannot be questioned 
r e g a r d l e s s  of r e s i d e n c e  a n d  t h e  
genealogical depth of the kin groups to 
which he or she belongs. 
In customary law, the reality is quite 
another matter. The available documents 
(or oral accounts) which mention claims, 
distributions or wills made in the past, 
show that the same person may exercise 
rights in land previously attributed to his 
immediate ancestors on both sides, paren- 
ts ,  grandparents  and tupuna (earlier 
relatives), or to members of various opu 
hoe of different categories of relatives. He 
or she therefore not only has possible ac- 
cess, jointly with his or her own siblings, 
to the inheritance which was transmitted 
to them in the direct line, but can also by 
v i r t u e  o f  r e s i d e n c e  s h a r e  i n  t h e  
inheritance of collateral branches which 
are no longer represented Jocally. In this 
c a s e  o n e  m a y  b e  dea l ing ,  i n  t h e  
sociological context of the extended OPU 
‘- hoe, with more distant relatives (uncles, 
aunts, cousins) who are  also the trustees’ 
of the legal titleholder. If the holder of a 
right living or dead, has no descendants 
at all, or  none living on the spot, his land 
returns to resident members of his opu 
hoe. Over two or three generations, this 
results in the loss of the property for 
those absent, as customarily land rights 
lapse  through lack of use. For the 
Polynesians,  therefore,  the recorded 
allocations do not always have the value 
of definite property titles which the Civil 
Code confers on them. The rules relating 
to residence are as important as descent 
establishing a person’s inheritance rights. 
Effective rights 
. 
If we use an analogy with the Civil 
Code, in customary law the originating 
members may hold three main categories 
of rights. These are the rights to use 
family lands, to reap the fruits of them, 
and to a certain extent to collect fees for 
their use. The resemblance goes no fur- 
ther.  A distinction must be made in 
customary law between the rights. at- 
tached to the forms of land use, and a 
right of control held by those who inter- 
vene within the various groups in the 
distribution of lands and plantations, and 
who play an important role in the system 
of property transmission. Here I shall 
describe the former. 
T h r e e  main categories of rights 
variable in content and duration, apply to 
different forms of land use. 
The first is the right to build one’s 
fare (house) on family land, and in par- 
ticular on a “city lot” allocated for this 
purpose. Throughout French Polynesia, 
residential fenua are often occupied by the 
homes of various members of the exten- 
ded family unit. Fenced in by white- 
washed walls in the Tuamotu and Austral 
Islands, or surrounded by shrubbery 
(especially in the Society Islands), these 
properties occupied for generations by the 
lines of residents testify to the per- 
manence of the family group. The right of 
res idence ,  over and above a man’s 
mobility and the impermanence of the 
buildings, has a truly perpetual character. 
The second is the right to plant food 
crops: tubers,  vegetables, musaceae, 
destined principally for family consump- 
tion; and cash crops, coconut palms, cof- 
fee or vanilla plantations, which earn in- 
come. By planting a person obtains exten- 
sive rights, for besides the possession and 
use of the  propefty, it is possible where 
perennial crops are concerned to entrust 
the operation to a third party who can 
t ransform or even destroy it. In the 
E a s t e r n  Tuamotus  as  well as t h e  
Australs, the Rural Economy Department 




fee  plantations belonging to planters 
whose parents were still alive. Property 
rights to  a plantation last in general as 
long a s  the crop: this can be less than a 
year for root crops; eighty years or more 
for coconut palms. The duration of a per- 
son’s r i g h t s  a lso depends upon the  
technical ability of the farmer to preserve 
the fertility of the ground, besides the fun- 
+ damental  requirement of residence. In 
Rurutu,  several taro plantations have 
been operated by the same lineage for 
generations: the, taro, a domesticated 
plant basic to everyday nutrition, is inten- 
s i v e l y  c u l t i v a t e d  wi th  t r ad i t i ona l  
techniques.-.Acquired rights, may- be fran- 
smitted to descendants as long as they 
remain resident. This does not apply to 
other tubers such as cassava and sweet 
p o t a t o e s ,  as t h e i r  s imple  plant ing 
techniques allow them to be grown on the 
poorest slopes or plains, not entailing per- 
‘manent occupation of the ground and con- 
sequent establishment of land rights of a 
particular user and his lineage. 
The third is the right to participate in 
, the profits of the plantations (coconut, 
coffee) set  up by their forebears, reserved 
by the heirs of the farmer if he is known, 
or if not, by the heirs of the previous 
titleholder, which is frequently the case in 
the Tuamotus. This right to harvest is 
collective, but in practice it is always in- 
dividual, following a property allocation 
(see p. 24) and it can be transferred to a 
third par ty  in the case of temporary ab- 
sence. But the beneficiary, unlike the 
planter who retains rights to the results of 
his efforts for his entire life, may not him- 
self destroy the plantation as he in- 
dividually is using a right which is essen- 
tially a collective one. The life-span of 
perennial crops is a factor attaching far- 
mers to  the ground but only if they bring 
an economic benefit, which is rarely the 
case in the present economic situation. 
Access to land 
\ 
F o r  a member of any particular 
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lineage, the means of access to effectí! 
ownership are extremely complex, depe4 
ding on residence and on the nature of the 
right of use involved: does he want toi t create a plantation or to obtain land b 
already planted? They depend also on his 1 
genealogical position within the various 
land groups which control the lands or 
plantations he wishes to obtain. 
To give a s  c lear  an  account as 
possible of the diversity of situations I en- 
countered, I will use precise examples 
taken from a particular “model”, taken 
from tomite and survey records in Takato, 
Ahe and Rurutu. Figure 3 shows two opu 
1 7, fetii -(I and -II-) originat-hg = from -+auples - 
whose forebears were considered to be the 
definitive titleholders of the rights now 
h e l d  b y  t h e i r  d e s c e n d a n t s .  T h e y  
proceeded with an initial allocation of the 
land amongst themselves (through the 
tomite for example) ,  amongst the i r  
children and some of their grandchildren 
(Generations 1 and 2), of whom several 
today have two generations of descen- 
d a n t s  t h e m s e l v e s .  Or ig ina l ly  t h i s  
distribution was uneven: the elders of 
Generation 1 benefitted most, while their 
resident childless brothers and sisters, or 
non-resident siblings married or adopted 
elsewhere, received less. 
In the opu fetii I, all of Generation 1 
having disappeared, the  allocation of 
property rights covering residential sites 
and the fenua planted by the tane of I, by 
his resident children and by A l  who today 
is a very old man, was made between the 
sole local representatives of the opu hoe 
originating from A, D, and E. 
D, who was the last  survivor of 
Generation 1, besides land disfributed to 
him by the tomite, took control of the 
lands claimed by childless B, and by C, 
whose descendants were all absent. He 
allocated the lands involved between the 
descendants of A (Al, A2, A3), D1 and 
EF1 (still alive at the time) who already 
had the use of the lands given to them by 
their ow% parents. 
\ 
This distribution will be temporary as 
on the death of EF1 with no local descen- 
dants, and in the absence of EF2 who was 
not living there at the time. A l  (the eldest 
member of the family) will take over con- 
trol of the lands of the deceased and 
a l loca te  them be tween the  resident 
descendants of A and D, reserving for his 
own opuhoe the larger part of the cake. 
When EF2 returns to claim his rights, he 
will not have much trouble in recovering 
the lands claimed by his father, but he 
will not be able to obtain any of thefenua 
amui of his uncle B and aunt C. 
When D of Generation 2 in his old age 
settles permanently in Papeete with one 
of his children, the same thing will not 
happen as he has been careful to have his 
son return to thefenuu to ensure the guar- 
dianship of his property. 
In the opu fetii II, the situation is even 
simpler. H, the sole survivor of his opu hoe 
(Generation 11, considers himself the only 
“owner” of the family lands, as well as 
those  a t t r ibu ted  in the  past  to  his 
deceased siblings who have descendants 
on the spot. 
Each  group of siblings and their 
descendants now have properties to be 
allocated between the various family cells 
composing the group. The rights to be em- 
ployed, and ways of obtaining access to 
the land depend on the social status of the 
persons involved and the form of land use. 
In principle the rights are  equal 
among the older group of siblings, as  each 
person, on division of the area by one of 
the elders, obtains according to hidher 
needs (number of children etc.), a portion 
of fenua (perennial plantations plus land to 
be developed) which is inherited through 
direct or collateral descent. Each person 
is m a s t e r  over his own part of the 
inheritance and it cannot be taken from 
him as long as he continues to use the 
land or  if i t  is exploited during his 
lifetime by one of his descendants, for 
example D1, who acts in the name of his 
father. Each time the inheritance is in- 
creased, for example by the death of EF1, 
or reduced, for example by the return of 
A3, a redistribution has to take place. In 
the first case, especially in the poorest 
islands, the eldest child is most likely to 
take the available plantations (Ravault, 
1978, p.66). In the second, a returning 
f ami ly  member  will be unwelcome, 
especially if he has been absent for a long 
time, but he has satisfied. Properties left 
unused o r  not yet distributed, a frequent 
situation in the Australs, will be con- 
trolled by the senior heir, who must agree 
to any fresh distribution of these lands. 
In  the  Tuamotus as well as the 
Australs, a certain number of lands ap- 
propriated by highly extended family 
groups a re  the object of conflicts between 
various branches. These are generally 
fenua of vast dimensions without any 
great economic interest (coral soil, slopes 
etc.); Having never been used, they sup- 
posedly belong to distant lupuna. In  
Rurutu, when the survey was made, a 
certain number of fenua were attributed to 
persons long since dead. Their localisation 
is the result of very old distributions. 
Members of restricted opu hoe who no 
longer have direct rights through living 
fo rebea r s  (D2 of Generation 3, and 
Generation 2 adults of opu ferrii I I )  are in 
a more precarious situation as they are 
not fatu mau, “true owners” according to 
the expression used in the Tuamotus. 
Their right to this categorisation is rarely 
disputed, but is reserved to the members 
of the eldest generations. In this case, D1 
and H who are the first to obtain the 
inheritance of their deceased siblings 
may, in principle, make use of the land as 
they wish. In fact, they must respect the 
earlier appropriation where the land has 
been continuously occupied. This is the 
case for G1 and G2 who divided their 
father’s land between them. But if heirs 
r e t u r n  t o  the  /enua t o  claim the i r  
inheritance rights from a deceased party 
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who never lived there (DY), they must 
give them lands where they can reside 
and plant, but may refuse them access to 
t h e  p e r e n n i a l  p l a n t a t i o n s .  In  t h e  
Tuamotus  there a r e  family members 
deprived of any access to the land. In the 
Australs where there is no lack of land, 
such occurrences are  probably very rare. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that 
minor children’s rights (11 and E) are 
held by an  elder who quite often has adop- 
ted them. 
M e m b e r s  who s t i l l  have l iving 
forebears with rights are  not “owners”. 
Nevertheless, depending on availability, 
they m a y  ask for land from their direct 
forebears (Al’), or failing that from other 
members of the family (D2’ from D1 and 
to Al) .  The latter, however, must give 
priority to  their own descendants. The op- 
portunity to build houses or to plant crops 
cannot be  refused them. The planting of 
perennial  crops o r  the  harvesting of 
productive plantations for the payment of 
a fee which in general represents 50% of 
the harvest, is subject to the residence of 
the holder of the “harvesting right” and 
the economic interest in such venture, 
variable from one archipelago to another. 
In  Rurutu and Rimatara where sig- 
nificant areas are  not developed and 
where coconut and coffee plantations are 
few and mainly for family use, access to 
l a n d  ownersh ip  does  not pose any  
problems. In the eastern Tuamotu ar- 
chipelago where copra is still in most of 
the islands the only source of revenue, the 
same is not always the case. The resident 
owners lease to their relatives of the 
younger generations only those lands that 
they do not want or cannot use, for in- 
stance because of their age, to make 
copra. I have even come across a few 
examples of fathers who have refused’ 
42 
their own children access to their pia$., 
tations. Those best off are the farmer<$ 
who look after the family lands on behalf i 
of their parents who reside in Tahiti (see ’!+ 
fig. 6, Dl’), and who frequently have 
other sources of revenue besides copra 
and so content themselves with a sym- 
bolic fee to prove their rights. 
The land tenure system 
This analysis of the customary land 
tenure system, makes it apparent that the 
rules which grant a person ownership - 
essentially ensure the continuity of the 
territorial settlements of family groups, 
and t h e  elimination of non-residents. 
Priority of inheritance in the direct line is 
also ensured although there can be suc- 
cession by collateral lines when effective 
rights a r e  no longer used. They also 
enable  a family member,  whilst his 
parents are  still alive, to acquire tran- 
smissible property rights to the lands he 
has planted. Insofar as these rights con- 
cern the crops and not the land they are 
temporary, but if they are  made use of 
continuously, within the same lineage, 
they tend to become perpetual. 
In this system, the role of the elders 
is clear. Within the extended opu hoe they 
control the rights no longer used because 
of departures and distribute them bet- 
ween different groups of siblings of the 
same level and within their own group. 
This authority, necessary for the system 
t o  func t ion  efficiently,  can involve 
privileges. During such distributions, it is 
tempting for elders to appropriate for 
themselves the vacant fenwr, especially if 
in the  past they were given to persons 
who left  no descendants lfenua amui). 













Figure 5: Kinship groups and access to land 
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I The distribution of property attributed 
to the key ancestor becomes confirmed 
over t ime, when a t  level 3 siblings with 
the i r  now descendants, classified as 
“third blood” (second cousins of the hina 
generation) are too distantly related to 
cooperate. The choice is twofold; either 
the last representative of the preceeding 
’ generation (Al  or any other surviving 
elder) by a parau iutu gives his blessing to 
previous distributions while distributing. 
the fenua amui under his control; or else 
the various groups of siblings concerned 
proceed with the distribution amongst 
themselves, often causing conflict. They 
t h e n  s e t  themselves  up in  various 
autonomous land groups. 
Alterations to customary law 
The land tenure system just described 
applies to all of the geographically distant 
and isolated islands, the eastern Tuamotu 
g r o u p ,  Ruru tu ,  R i m a t a r a ,  and the  
Marquesas. These have preserved their 
socio-ethnic purety (eastern Tuamotus), 
. ar assimilated other ethnic elements, and 
so  up to  now have  conserved their 
tradit ional social structures and com- 
muna1 institutions, enabling them to react 
in a specific manner to the colonial tran- 
sformations. There is no doubt that the 
collective control of land associated with 
the exercise of individual effective rights, 
a consequence of the spread of a cash 
economy, is an adaptation of traditional 
institutions to modern times. 
People in the Society archipelago, 
western Tuamotu group, and Tubuai from 
. the beginning of the 19th century onwards 
had strong ties with the outer world. 
Economic contacts resulted in an increase 
of inter-island schooner traffic and the 
establishment of trading posts, and in a 
multiplication of marriage alliances with 
the popaa and demis. The customary land 
t e n u r e  s y s t e m  unde rwen t  marked  
modifications both in its operation and in 








Tuamotu group, the  tomite procedui  
which was  made  obligatory by the  
colonial authorities (see p. 51, merely con-’: 
stituted a step in the customary process 
of transmission and distribution of proper- 
ty. Elsewhere it was the beginning of a 
process which could have resulted in the 
progressive paralysis of the traditional 
system, and the establishment of a joint 
possession situation related in some 
aspects to that of the Civil Code. 
F r o m  the t ime of the first land 
allocations and much . later-joint-owner----- 
sh ip  r i g h t s  were  questioned. Some 
Polynesians,  constrained by various 
provisions of the Civil Code (see p. 71, or 
influenced by its individualistic approach, 
acted beyond the  rights of use and 
possession given them by custom and, 
using prerogatives reserved until then for 
their elders, disposed of their heritage by 
alienation or by legacies to people 6ften 
enterprising Polynesians, who were not 
always close relatives (members of the 
extended opu hoe)  or residents. In doing 
so, they not only became conscious or un- 
conscious creators of individual owner- 
ship, but also were largely responsible for 
t h e  p r o g r e s s i v e  p a r a l y s i s  of t h e  
c u s t o m a r y  sys tem.  Abandoning the  
traditional principles of distribution and 
transmission of property weakened the 
authority of the elders. Divisions were no 
longer carried out under customary law, 
and it was no longer possible to maintain 
joint possession at the level of theopu hoe 
or socially coherent kin group. In each 
generation, rights on the contrary became 
more and more spread out as the joint 
owners were obliged to refer to the 
titleholders to justify their rights. 
The weakening of fellowship between 
ferii, which is the consequence of this ex- 
tension of land groups, can involve two 
main types of conflicts. 
In the first, residents are opposed to 
non-residents, who may b,e tempted to ask 
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fairly often in the Society archipelago. Or 
they may claim their share of the har- 
vest, which occurs less frequently. The 
. res idents  a re  unlikely to give them 
satisfaction by adhering to the concept of 
ownership contained in the Civil Code, for 
it is not in their interests to accept the 
amputation of their inheritance and to 
g r a h t  non-residents effective rights 
refused them by customary law. 
In the second case, the residents come 
into conflict among themselves over 
working on jointly owned properties. An- 
nual -crops are - rarely ‘an issue for the 
rights they give rise to ‘are not long- 
lasting, but the same does not always ap- 
ply to perennial plantations. There are 
two possibilities: either different branches 
of the same family are  unable to reach 
agreement on the distribution of rights 
and the fenua are either occupied by force 
or deserted when the conflict becomes too 
bitter. Or else a modus vivendi. which nor- 
mally reflects only the relations of force, 
is established between the families in- 
volved. Each one then has a certain num- 
ber of fenua which; depending on the kind 
of plantations concerned (coconuts in the 
‘Society and western Tuamotu Islands, or 
c o f f e e  p lan ta t ions  in  the Australs  
(Tubuai), are worked in diferent ways. In 
the first case, each of the titleholders is 
allowed to harvest the crop periodically 
for number of years. In the second case, 
the plantation is open to one and all at a 
given date, but each person harvests the 
coffee for himself and according to his 
ability. A means for distributing the har- 
vests “in time” is substituted for the 
customary distribution “in space”. In- 
stead of each titleholder becoming respon- 
sible for a parcel of land as long as he 
resides on it, the result is a de facto joint 
ownership situation like that of the Civil 
Code. A s  nobody wants to work for 
anyone else, and this discourages all land 
investment. 
‘ 
The land system and the special case of 
rural leases 
For several decades, officials respon- 
sible for development were mainly con- 
cerned with the problems of joint owner- 
ship. Recently, especially since the ad- 
ministration’s document regulating rural 
l ea ses  t o  allow the. development of 
modern agriculture, a significant debate 
has started about the status of farmers 
who a re  not owners. This is particularly 
important in the Society Archipelago, 
where >land is often f o r m e d u d e r  leases. 
T h e s e  m a y  be  w r i t t e n  o r  spoken  
agreements by which the holder of land 
rights transfers their use to an outsider. 
The t e rms  of the lease cover the area of 
land made available and the particular 
forms of its use, the legal conditions of 
use - farming, share-cropping - the 
period of the lease and the fees payable. 
The rights given under a lease vary 
according to the property system covering 
the land concerned. In the individualistic 
and exclusive concept of the Civil Code 
(Ravault, 1972 and 19741, the lease covers 
“the ground and everything above it” 
(houses, plantations) which in the case of 
indirect farming constitutes the usable 
unit. 
In the case of joint ownership, the 
crops a re  the issue and not the ground. 
Depending on the type of joint ownership 
one is confronted with (customary law 
joint possession, or joint ownership of the 
Civil Code type), the consequences of this 
break-up can be quite different. 
In the first case the land is distributed 
by area,  and the leasehold can be con- 
sidered, regardless of the standing crops, 
as the unit of use. It can be fransferred 
by the holder of the rights on condition he 
occupies the land. With this proviso, 
which is related to the basic nature of the 
land tenure systems involved, a person 
finds himself in an individual ownership 
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situation like that provided for in the Civil 
Code. 
customary divisions are no longer carried 
out, and all rights are held jointly, the 
definition of the leasehold depends*on the 
type of land use that has evolved. Each 
new planting constitutes a unit of use, 
whatever the complexity and nature of 
later improvements that may have been 
made. If the crops concerned are annual 
ones, perhaps replanted two or three 
times on a slope fu fuupu on a slope), the. 
r i g h t s -  c rea ted  become -extinct very 
quickly and the property returns to the 
f a m i l y  i n h e r i t a n c e .  If c o m b i n e d  
cultivations are concerned, as for instance 
in the dominant agricultural landscape of 
coconut palms, bananas and root crops, 
o v e r  t i m e  t h e  s h o r t - t e r m  c r o p s  
progressively disappear while the coconut 
plantation persists for several decades. 
This will  be managed on a rotation 
system by the heirs of the planters. The 
holder of the right to harvest can transfer 
his rights to a third party, whether a 
relative or not, while another titleholder 
can plant jehi or taro underneath the 
coconut trees. A plurality of cultivations 
can correspond therefore to a plurality of 
individual or collective rights of use, 
direct or indirect. In such conditions, as 
there is no longer any unified use, the 
analysis of land use and subsequent iden- 
tification of crops to be leased must be 
made by a meticulous analysis of the 
agricultural landscape. 
The fees and duration of a lease are 
agreed by the two parties. The type of 
land use allowed by the lease depends on 
the agricultural activity, whatever the 
ownership system may be. It is possible to 
distinguish crops bringing in revenue 
( c o p r a ,  vanilla, coffee) from those 
destined to feed the family. 
In the first case, an owner wil l  sign a 
lease with a market gardener who sells 
almost all of his harvest. This type of 
When in the second case, where t h e ’  
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lease, found increasingly near the 1% 
res ident ia l  market places in  Tahi, 
Moorea and Raiatea, becomes more lik 
tenant farming each time the lessee geh 
authority to cut down the coconut palms 
on the leased property. Or the owner will! 
sign a share-cropping lease (the price 
varying with the quantity and value of the 
harvest)  with a lessee who runs the 
coconut, vanilla or coffee plantation. 
In the second case, there is a kind of 
lease found only in the Tenitory which 
could be considered “caretaking”, in the 
strict sense, as the user does not pay fees 
.of any sort; This applies to all types of 
plantations (sunken taro plantations, fuupu 
mua on hill slopes, crop-growing under 
coconut palms etc.). Within the context of 
Polynesian joint ownership, as well as the 
important demi estates dedicated to copra 
and intensive farming. The-owners are of- 
ten absent and content themselves on 
their visits with presentations of a bundle 
of taro, a stem of bananas, a suckling pig 
etc., which the share-cropper caretakers 
consider simply as gifts. 
The price charged leasehold rights 
varies. The Chinese in Tahiti who practise 
“mountain truck farming” pay very lit- 
t l e ;  b u t  on the  plains ,  because of 
speculation, land rentals can sometimes 
reach exhorbitant rates. 
In share-cropping, the calculation of 
the respective shares of the owners and 
the lessees is fairly strictly defined. When 
an owner grants a farmer land that has 
already been planted with coconuts or cof- 
fee for example, the rule is to split the 
harvest fifty/fifty. When he leases land to 
be developed (by planting vanilla, for in- 
stance), the tenant receives 75 to 80% of 
the harvest=produce. The work involved in 
establishing the plantation and wages for 
workers when the flowers are “married” 
etc., a re  responsible for this better rate. 
In. the absence of a written contract 
mentioning the terms of the lease, the 







duration of plantation (faapu). This in- 
volves the distinction of cultivations with 
short or average vegetative cycles (root 
crops and vanilla essentially), and plan- 
tations (coffee and especially coconut) 
which can produce for several decades. 
In the  first case, the initial lease 
which must allow the farmer to harvest a 
matured crop is of variable duration: a 
few ’weeks for vegetables, several months 
for sweet potatoes, one year for water- 
melon, three years for vanilla etc. The 
lease is then tacitly renewed, expiring in 
r ea l i t y  only when t h e  returns have 
become ridiculously low. Quite often the 
farmer- abandonsthe -plot  bf lalid- before- 
. the ground becomes barron. The owner, 
on the other hand, recovers land that 
brings in a fair return. Whatever the case, 
the duration of the lease does not depend 
solely on the crops grown but on the 
technical capacity of the farmer to main- 
tain the fertility of the land as long âs 
possible. Except for a few cases’(swamp 
t a r o ,  van i l l a ) ,  this is not easy  in 
tradition al  agriculture. 
precise rule - all depends on the mobility 
, of the farmer and especially on the will of 
’ the owner who, if he wants to, can hire a 
share-cropper for a single copra or vanilla 
harvest. Where joint ownership is defined 
by the  Civil Code, “rotation” makes 
leaseholds less secure. 
Whereas joint ownership represents a 
form of resistance and adaptation to the 
colonial system, the establishment of the 
system of leases just described was en- 
couraged on the legal level, by, the lax 
character of the Civil Code. In the ab- 
sence of any regulations, this favours land 
owners to the detriment of the farmers 
who are  left with no legal status. On an 
agricultural level it was encouraged by 
the existence of intensive agriculture 
characterised, save for exceptions like the 
division of taro plantations, by archaic 
techniques and mediocre production, 
In perennial agriculture there is no . 
. 
which similarly privileged people holding 
rights to  large areas. On a cultural level, 
these two factors are closely linked by the 
impor tance  placed on the social and 
professional mobility of men. 
This lease system conveys perfectly 
the relationship of domination established 
between the beneficiaries of the develop- 
ment of a trade economy (the halfcaste 
middle class and joint land right holders), 
and , t h e  Polynesian farmers who find 
themselves deprived of land and unsup- 
ported by custom. 
This system of land tenure is par- 
ticularly backward in regard to rural 
leas%holds,’ and is responsibEfor the- poor 
results of the territory’s agriculture. 
III  T h e  L a n d  T e n u r e  System and 
Agriculture 
For  the past few years, especially the 
five year  plan began in 1971, the govern- 
ment of French Polynesia has tried to 
d e v i s e  a n d  p u t  i n t o  operat ion a n  
agricultural development programme. 
One goal of this programme was to 
allow land improvement by initiating 
structural reforms in areas as diverse as 
professional organisation, cash flow, and 
the land tenure system itself. 
Another  was directly to promote 
agricultural improvement. In the Society 
Islands the  means used included the 
development of crop and animal produc- 
tion (vegetables, fruit, eggs, milk, meat 
etc.) for local consumption, and to a new 
s t a r t  ( m a i n l y  i n  t h e  d i s t a n t  a r -  
ch ipe lagoes)  for the  export of such 
products as coffee, vanilla and of course 
copra, by assuring an improvement both 
in the existing plantations and in the plant 
stock, which almost everywhere was at 
the end of its life span. 
Such a programme has a twofold ob- 
jective, economic and social: to increase 
agricultural productivity to satisfy local 
demand, permitting a reduction in the 
economic deficit; and to increase the 
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standard of living of the farmers to con- 
tribute to  stabilising the rural population 
in their own districts and islands. The 
results unfortunately have not been up to 
expectations. 
Agriculture is in decline. In the Wmd- 
ward Islands available statistics on com- 
mercial production, obtained from the 
market in Papeete, show that traditional 
cultivation of musaceae, root crops, and 
um (breadfruit)  is m aintained, while 
copra, coffee, and vanilla have lost almost 
all importance. Elsewhere, subsistence 
agriculture persists, but the main export 
products-are -goingAhrough-a -particularly 
serious crisis. The coffee plantations of 
the Australs and the Marquesas Islands 
have been abandoned or are under-ex- 
ploited: exported in part until W, coffee 
no longer satisfies even local demand. 
The vanilla plantations which contributed 
significantly in the past to cash revenue, 
especially in the Leeward Islands, have 
almost all been abandoned and the export 
of dried vanilla has fallen to practically 
nothing! The productive potential of the 
coconut plantations, which has not been 
revitalised except in the eastern part of 
\ the Tuamotus, remains under-exploited 
especially in the centre and western zones 
of the Tuamotu  and the Tubuai. Copra 
production, after a temporary burst in 
1975, in 1978 reached its lowest point since 
the end of the war, with less than 13,000 
tons. 
Agriculture is also characterised by 
the difference which is tending to deepen, 
be tween  t h e  productive capacity of 
agriculture for the open market and for 
local demand. Production of vegetable 
and a n i m a l  foostuffs is concentrated 
essentially in Tahiti and to a lesser extent 
in Raiatea, Hauhine (melons and water- 
melons) ,  and in Tubuai (vegetables, 
especially potatoes), and cannot really 
take off, in spite of progress made since 
1971. 




mercial agriculture can be summed up i\ 
a few figures. Its place in the Polynesian 1% 
economy of fifteen years ago was essen- i 
importance: 6.73% of the Gross National 1 P r o d u c t  (GNP) ( Inst i tut  d’Emission 
d’Outre-Mer, 1976, p.11). The value of 
local commercial production (retail price) 
has‘never reached 25% of that of impor- 
ted foodstuffs. For the first time in 1977, 
.its -share of the total value of imports 
r e a c h e d  22%. That  s a m e  year, the 
“covering rate of imports by exports 
(essentially agricultural) was only 5% . . .” 
Can the land tenure system of French 
Polynesia be held responsible for such a 
situation in view of the other constraints 
on agricultural  development? A land 
tenure system will increase production 
while improving the standard of living of 
the farmers, in a cash economy only if it 
ensures the security of leaseholds. The ap- 
propriated lands must be identified and 
demarcated; the holders of land rights 
must be known, whether they be in- 
dividuals or groups; and a person must be 
easily able to give proof of such rights. 
In addition, something must be done 
to enable farmers to initiate projects of a 
size appropriate to their work potential 
and their needs and in a site favourable to 
- t h a t  par t icular  agricultural activity. 
There should be sufficient legal control of 
the land to allow techniques to be im- 
proved and investments to be agreed. And 
finally, farmers should be able to make a 
fair profit from their labours. 
The land system in French Polynesia 
does not fulfil either of these conditions. 
tia1 but now it has become of hardly any i 
7.. (S.E.R.,-1976,-~.6). 1 1  
Security of leaseholds 
Neither civil law nor customary law 
gives sufficient guarantee of ownership or 
ensures the legal security of leasehold 
tenure. 
The deeds of ownership delivered by 
the administration do not always give suf- 
I ‘i 
8 “ 2  
ficient guarantee with regard to the limits 
and content of land as well as an iden- 
tification of the owners. Under such con- 
d i t i o n s ,  t h e  s e r v i c e s  of the  Land 
Registration Department are restricted, 
and as Coppenrath (n.d.,.p.l) has pointed 
out, the mortgage system which is per- 
sonal can “only fulfil its goal on the con- 
dition that deeds giving the lay-out of a 
given piece of real estate be perfectly 
drawn up and contain precise and full in- 
formation on the identities of the parties.” 
Not only landin joint ownership is in- 
volved here, and the insecurity is not only 
legal. The thirty-year leasehold guaran- 
tees a “purchaser of real estate against 
the claims of an heir of a joint owner 
unknown until such time” (Coppenrath, 
n.d., PA), but it does not protect a person 
from encroachments by the descendants 
of the seller who consider, often quite 
rightly, that the property rights were not 
always transferred correctly. On this 
issue, the Teva Nui Association made 
some “absolutely shocking discoveries” 
(Tauhiti, 1978, p.18). It is useless to point 
out that  these facts feed the bitterness of ‘ the rural  population towards the demis 
and the administration, and that they 
form the basis of court cases which in no 
way encourage  the exploitation and 
development of the land. 
Legal provisions do not ensure the 
security of the leaseholds, and neither 
does customary law. This is only to be ex- 
pected when it has lost its substance. A 
co-owner who take the risk of working 
land appropriated by a social group 
larger than the extended o p  hoe may find 
himself in conflict with the most distant 
fetÌi. The “stealing” of copra harvests is 
often at the base of a great deal of 
litigation in the western Tuamotu and the 
Leeward Islands. However, one should not 
exaggerate its significance: there can be 
such other  reasons for under-worked 
coconut plantations as the poor pur- 
chasing power of copra. Panoff (1964, p. 
. 
123) pertinently noted that land conflicts 
which form a “highight in social life” 
most often concern land of no great 
economic value. This remark is true of 
the Australs, but does not always apply to 
the atolls of the Tuamotu archipelago 
where all the fenua planted have an 
economic interest. 
Another factor of insecurity of land 
development is the possibility of non- 
resident eo-owners claiming under the 
Civil Code the part of the copra or coffee 
harvest which customary law refuses 
them. Most of the time they do nothing 
about it or they content themselves with a 
symbolic fee. Even where custom has 
been mos t  altered,  the  principle of 
residence continues to influence their 
behaviour, if only because the products in 
this case have a low marketable value. 
Would this be the same if the island 
products were suddenly greatly revalued? 
In the most distant archipelagoes (the 
eastern Tuamotu zone, Rurutu, Rimatara) 
where the traditional social structures 
have been preserved, such conflicts are 
rare for the way in which customary law 
works has not yet changed profoùndly. 
However, at the present time there no 
longer exists locally any centralised 
organisat ion to  preserve traditional 
documents and make them available for 
consultation. In Rurutu the registers of 
customary jurisdiction which were kept 
up to 1945 were destroyed by cyclone 
E m m a  in 1970. In the Tuamotus, the 
“district books’’ in which land deeds were 
preserved have disappeared. At present, 
family members who are not elders have 
much trouble in obtaining the genealogies 
preserved by their elders, and consider 
therefore that they do not have access to 
all the land they could have rights to. 
In Tatakoto, some properties have 
been claimed by several family groups 
only because certain genealogies have 
been manipulated. If these conflicts do not 




Total Size (ha) Size (ha.) Properties 
<5 % >50 % 
Individual 47 27 5.5 2 34.1 




Total Sixc (ha.) Size (ha.) 
e 5  >SO % 
96 88 16.7 2 62.6 
66 49 13.6 1 50.9 
which is entirely used, the rights of the 
occupants remain the strongest. 
C o n d i t i o n s  of a c c e s s  t o  l a n d  a n d  
agricultural activity 
. Both the provisions related to t h e .  
methods of acquisition and transmission 
of land, and those that define the content 
and duration of land rights are unsatisfac- 
tory a n d  neither the Civil Code nor 
customary law in the socio-economic con- 
text of French Polynesia allows a person 
access to land to farm under satisfactory 
conditions. 
Present structures of land tenure are 
characterised firstly by a quantitative 
distribution of individual or joint-owned 
properties (“potential” rights) which is 
particularly inequitable. 
Because of the failings of the system 
of registration of land rights, here are no 
i 
5. ‘i 
overall statistics available on the matter, 2 
but the little precise information available 
corroborates the impressions obtainable <\ 
through actual knowledge of the land and i 
the  examination (Jf aerial photographs ’ 
available for the Society archipelago. 
The partial I!j%; census of properties1 
of more than SO hectares made on the 
basis of areas registered for the survey 
p l a n  g a v e  thc  f o l l o w i n g  r e s u l t s  
(Guillaume, 19.56, Appendix III, ~ . 4 ) : ~  
‘ 
Tahiti Moorea Itaiatea Tahaa Huahine 
26.3% 20.8% 4f;.df%, ‘ 30% 19% 
Locally, in Maharepa-Moorea in 1966 
and in Papeari-?‘ilhiti in 1968 (Ravault, 
1967, p.75; 1977a, Appendices I and II), the 
division of property gave rise to a distinc- 
tion between what Ihmont (n.d., p.5) has 
called “latifundia” and “microfundia”. 
These figures show that joint owner- 
ship diminishes the effects of land concen- 
tration while aggravating the consequen- 
ces of micro-ownership. This distribution 
is the result after several decades of 
evolution of the interplay of property tran- 
sactions which took place during the first 
part of the century, and of subsequent 
evolution which sa% a good number of the 
more important estates appropriated by 
default and fall into joint possession and, 
conversely, a certain number of individual 
and joint-owned properties broken up by 
the practice of distribution. 
This distribution is fundamental to the 
structure of land tenure. A minority of 
land owners (maitily demis and popaal 
concentrate in their hands an important 
proportion of availilble land, while the 
majority of other t i l  lcholders (essentially 
Polynesians) are rctluced to a bare living. 
In the case of joint ownership, one 
c a n  note  an uncyual distribution of 
property rights at the level of potential 
group rights as well t is at the level of ef- 
fective individual rights. It has already 
been pointed out tiow, by virtue of the 
principle of residence, localised branches 
of the same family could recover land left 
vacant by branches which had migrated 
elsewhere; but in gciicral the eldest bran- 
ches would give thcmselves the better 
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part  of the  cake. Within the same group of 
resident siblings, the distribution of effec- 
tive rights, over two or three generations 
results in further inequities. 
The principle of residence, in conjunc- 
. tion with rights of descent encourages a 
concentration of ownership and con- 
stitutes an  effective monopoly. But it is 
necessary to point out that those who 
monopolise the land are  residents capable 
of developing it themselves while the 
owners of latifundia appropriated in- 
dividually are most often absentees. 
Secondly, the structure of tenure is 
characterised by a parcelling of property, 
more typical of joint ownership than of in- 
dividual ownership, especially in the 
Tuamotu Islands. 
Under individual ownership, quan- 
titative distribution and parcelling of land 
are  connected phenomena dependent on 
land history. The microfundia are not 
operated not because they are broken up, 
but because their size renders difficult 
their use for agricultural purposes. In 
spite of transfers (distributions, sales) 
’which may  have affected them, large or 
al’erage properties provide valleys, and 
plateaux land in the plains, for various 
agricultural purposes and may be worked 
under suitable conditions. 
Guillaume (1956, Appendix III. p.6) 
considered that the subdivision of proper- 
ties was not pushed very f a r  because of 
the joint. ownership of the land. In fact,. 
apart  from large plots which have no 
precise  attr ibution within the group 
because of their low economic value and 
are  consequently no longer occupied, the 
customary practice of generations never 
t o  r e g r o u p  p a t e r n a l  and ma te rna l  
inheritances hag led to subdivision on a 
large scale in the most utilised areas: the 
residential zones and taro fields of the 
Australs, and the coconut plantations of 
the eastern Tuamotus. A high level of in- 
. .  
termarriage, a situation prevalent in the 
outer archipelagoes, also increases this 
.subdivision. In Tatakoto where the sur- 
face a rea  is approximately 600 hectares, 
claims broke up the atoll into more than 
2,500 plots. As groups hold land in each of 
the three sectors, there are farmers who 
make copra in ten or more plots spread 
all over the atoll. In the high islands, 
where the  more numerous population is 
spread out over several districts, the in- 
conveniences of subdivision are less sig- 
nificant. Distributions are often carried 
out by taking into account the parents’ 
residence: one child will go to live in his 
father’s village, another to his mother’s 
village. 
The third characteristic of the land 
tenure structures is the high frequency of 
absenteeism which applies more to in- 
dividual than joint ownership. 
In Maharepa in 1966, 67.1% of land ap- 
propriated individually belonged to absent 
persons, 94.6% of whom lived in the 
residential zone. In Papeari in 1968, land 
absenteeism was not so widespread. 
Among individual owners, it applied to 
only 37.1% of titleholders and 29.8% of 
areas concerned, but in urban areas it 
reached 89% (see Appendix I). 
Absenteeism. developed over time. 
Copra revenues made the land initially an 
instrument to obtain the economic and 
social success which could be realised 
only in the city. The crisis of the colonial 
economy, more apparent after the end of 
the second world war, discouraged invest- 
m e n t  i n  agr icu l ture .  During g rea t  
economic changes of the last few years, 
land became a tool of speculation. In 
Tahiti, Moorea, Raiatea, and even in 
T a h a a ,  a new form of absenteeism 
developed: the plots of “developed” 
estates (see Appendix III) were acquired 
by members of social categories who, 
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along with the traditional mixed-race mid- 
dle-class,  made the most out of the 
economic expansion: merchants, civil ser- 
vants, members of the liberal professions, 
well-to-do pensioners. An analysis of the 
authorisations fur real estate transfers for 
the past  ten years shows that rural people 
rarely purchase land and, when the case 
arises, have no possibility of purchasing 
property. they--have used under joint - 
possession before it has been allocated to . 
their non-resident ferii. 
Under joint ownership, absenteeism is 
far less common, whether it concerns 
land groups as a whole or individuals who 
are uwners of effective land rights (par- 
ticipation in the harvests of perennial 
crops 1 .  
In Papeari in 1968 (see Appendix II), 
only 18% of the district’s property groups 
were not represented locally and they 
held only 3% of the district lands. The 
TABLE 2 
’ ”I 
majority of owners lived in the ruri+ 
world and were related to families w& 
had  settled in the district. In the Leeward 
I s l a n d s  and  the Australs, a precise. 
analysis would certainly give comparable 
results. In the less populated central and 
western Tuamotu the figures would be 
much’higher. As indicated above (see p. 
42) absenteeism at this level is due 
mainly to- economic-fxctors: 
Among individual holders of effective 
property rights, absenteeism is related 
primarily to the increasing economic im- 
portance of cash crops (copra, coffee), 
and secondly to the extent to which- 
customs have changed. Absenteeism is 
not very widespread .in Rurutu where 
copra, coffee and vanilla are limited. This 
is not the case in Tuamotu. The following 
figures for Ahe and Tatakoto show the 
distribution of owners receiving income 
from copra, according to residence: 
Residents (RI Non-residents (RI 
. Not working ’ Working the land ‘ the land , 
Ahe 18 19 26 
Tatakoto 12 13 20 
In Tatakoto, besides a certain number ~ The effects of property structure on forms 
of temporary  absentees who granted of owner-farming 
share-croppers the use of their land, there 
was a fairly large number of elderly 
people who controlled land “kept” for 
them by younger relatives. In Ahe, where 
c u s t o m s  h a v e  not been  so closely 
followed, a few non-residents share in the 
copra revenues. 
I t’must be pointed out that, in both cases, 
I n  t h e  Society archipelago, the 
property structure is characterised by an 
extremely unequal distribution and a high 
degree of absenteeism. This is responsible 
for a very clear predominance of indirect 
owner-farming, únless the land is used for 
speculative development or simply left 
idle. 
absenteeism is fairly high but has no For instance, in Maharepa-Moorea in 
great economic significance since the fees 1966 ( s ee  a l s o  Appendix  V ) ,  t h e  
paid remain very low. distribution of forms of owner-farming by 
geographic areas (in percentages of plots 





Direct owner-f arming 35.6 
Indirect owner-farming by lease 10.5 
by caretaking 3.2 
Undetermined 0.7 






Share-cropping of coconut and vanilla owner-farming and caretaking of lands 
plantations predominated everywhere. b e l o n g i n g  t o  r e s iden t s ,  or locally 
Caretaking is common in valley culti- represented property groups, prevail. 
vation, but the leasehold remains tenuous. Coconut, coffee and other vanilla plan- 
Plain 70 
Under joint ownership, depending on en- 
vironmental factors and the economic and 
socio-cultural context variable from island 
to island, the distribution of forms of 
owner-farming depends mainly upon the 
ultimate agricultural activity. 
Valley 70. 
tations a re  farmed by their owners; ex- 
cept when they are abandoned for more 
remunerative employment provided by 
the government or local commune. Absent 
holders of harvesting rights never make 
their presence felt. Only a few elderly 
persons with no cash income give their 
Direct owner-farming (A) Share-cropping (B) Total 
137 
l27 
107 Tatakoto 28 
Ahe 17 3 110 
I 
In Rurutu which has conserved an ïand over to share-croppers. 
- 
agriculture essentially oriented towards The following was the situation in 
food crops (taro, manioc etc.), direct Papeari in 1968: 
TABLE 4 
i. Direct o wner-f arming 











I I 1 
In Papeari, the development of wage- 
earning related to the Atomic Testing farmers. 
Programme can explain the decline in ex- 
port crops and the near-disappearance of 
share-cropping. Only food crops destined 
for family use and sale in the Papeete 
market a re  still grown, mainly by owner- 
In the Tuamotu Islands where copra 
is the main source of cash, the situation is 
completely different as the cases of Ahe 




These figures reflect the social struc- 
ture. On both of these atolls, the farmers 
represent only a minority of people in- 
terested in the operation of the coconut 
plantations. 
- 
Control of land 
In the  past jurists and agronomists 
have emphasized the advantages offered 
by individual ownership as compared to 
joint ownership. This opinion should be 
considerably modified in view of the 
socio-economic context. 
According to the Civil Code, “owner- 
ship is the right to make use of and 
dispose of things absolutely”, that is, to 
make no use of them, to make extensive 
use of them, or make use of them for ends 
other than  agriculture. In a country’ where 
a n u m b e r  of o w n e r s ,  w h e n  n o t  
speculating, remain attached to the forms 
of land  utilisation inherited from the 
colonial period (extensive coconut plan- 
tations and rearing), the concept of ab- 
solute control as contained in the Civil 
Code is a n  obstacle t o  agricultural 
development. It must be pointed .out that, 
because of (competition from imported 
products etc.), the present economic* con- 
text is hardly favourable to agriculture 
and property investment involves a risk 
tha t  only a minority of owners have 
taken. The majority prefer to lease their 
land to  planters at  high rates, the latter 
concentrating on cultivations that satisfy 
the needs of the local market. Or they en- 
trust their  coconut plantations to share- 
croppers who cannot alter the ultimate 
form of the plantation. In the context‘of a 
colonial economy, the Civil Code con- 
tributed to  the creation of a class of par- 
t icular ly  disadvantaged farmers with 
neither status nor true control of the land. 
Within the context of joint ownership, 
t h e  m a i n  c r i t i c i s m s  m a d e  b y  
agriculturalists are  on the level of main- 
tenance and renewal of the plantations. 
A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e m ,  i n  shor t  t e r m  
% 
cultivation, joint ownership is not a t .  
drance because the farmer gains dur$ 
the year  from the effort he has put inh- 
the task of cultivation. However, “it doe8 
not encourage one to improve the ground, 
or to  take  advantage of manuring which 
would mainly profit the successors to the 
land. In the case of perennial cultivations 
. . . no co-owners . . . appear to want tc  
give themselves the trouble of caring for 
the plantations, the benefit of which would 
go to their  successors. Even more serious 
none of the co-owners wishes to make 2 
decis ion to  renew the  plantation ox 
regenerate it. This decision can only bf 
made by all of the interested parties. 
amounts to saying that a jointly ownec 
property is automatically deprived of tht 
benefi ts  of property improvements.’ 
(Report on the agricultural policy of tht 
government, 1963). 
In the  archipelagoes where customarj 
s p a c i a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n s  g i v e  t h e i i  
beneficiaries extended rights which can 
not be contested as long as they residt 
there, such criticisms are  ill-founded. Thc 
success of regeneration of the coconu 
plantations in some of the atolls of thc 
eastern Tuamotu zone, and the creation o 
a certain number of new coffee plan 
tations in Rurutu and Rimatara, are proo 
of this. Apart from the economic context 
the main obstacle to agriculturaf progresi 
here is not the land tenure system but thc 
conservative outlook which characterise: 
all rural  societies, especially when elderl! 
persons a re  called upon to make thc 
essen t ia1 decisions. 
On the other hand these comment 
sum up the inconveniences of joint owner 
ship for  agricultural  development 01 
islands where customary law has lost it 
influence. The system of joint ownershil 
explains the difficulties encountered tel 
or fiteen years ago by the Department o 
R u r a l  Economy i n  encouraging th  
renewal of coconut plantations (centra 
and western zones of the Tuamotu Is 
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lands), and the regeneration of the coffee 
plantations (for instance in Tubuai and 
Raivavae) ,  even when its initial per- 
suasion was successful. 
In  a traditional -agricultural system, 
hardly preoccupied by the idea of produc- 
tion per unit area, except for a few crops 
(swamp taro and vanilla), which involve 
simple methods suited to  local harvesting 
techniques, joint ownership does not sig- 
nificantly hinder production as long as the 
- security of the leaseholds is ensured at 
opu hoe levels, which in any case is not 
supposed to provide for a high standard of 
living:. 
In  subsistence production, involving 
t radi t ional  complex agricultural com- 
b i n a t i o n s  of p e r e n n i a l  p lan ta t ions  
(coconut and vanilla) with short term 
cultivations (musaceae and root crops), 
the Polynesians, especially in the Society 
Islands, do not see the advantages of a 
l a n d  t e n u r e  s y s t e m  which  whi le  
authorising the superimposition of effec- 
tive rights, allows several farmers to use 
the s a m e  space. The harvesting of joint- 
owned coconut and coffee plantations 
requi res  only a minimum of upkeep 
necessary to collect the products and is 
the’ s a m e  everywhere regardless of the 
system of ownership. 
. 
IV Reform of the Land Tenure System 
I have. tried in the  main report, 
without formulating any value judgemen- 
ts, to analyse the land tenure systems of 
French Polynesia and to show how they 
may  inf luence agricul tural  activity. 
Without going into detail about land 
tenure arrangements, the adjustment of 
which depends on the skill of legal exper- 
ts, I would now like to point out what the 
main basis for land reforms in the rural 
world ought to be, taking into account the 
government’s  goals for  agricultural  
development within the market economy. 
The reform of the land system con- 
s idered  here, is not a n  agricultural 
reform. The government has no intention 
of reconsidering rights of ownership by 
‘ initiating a redistribution of unused or un- 
der-worked latifundia. The idea is to en- 
courage the major landowners to develop 
their properties, or to allow for them to be 
farmed by third parties under reasonable 
conditions. The solution‘of the problem of 
joint ownership can be found only by 
acknowledging the situation as it is and 
by attempting to adapt it. 
Reforms of any kind are difficult to 
promote in French Polynesia for any legal 
document, which inevitably is of general 
application, must be adapted to correct 
failings in the land tenure systems of very 
different socio-economic regions. Joint 
ownership of the Civil Code type common 
in the Society archipelago and the western 
Tuamotus, and the cause of innumerable 
conflicts, has not much to show for it in 
comparison with customary joint owner- 
ship which continues to function normally. 
In these conditions, in the local context, 
the establishment of an effective reform 
requires the following. 
New legislation needs to take into con- . 
sideration existing structures while being 
aware of their evolution and change. This 
means that on the one hand, without 
d i s r ega rd ing  the  “potentialities” of 
metropolitan law where it is applicable, it 
may be necessary to innovate. In par- 
ticular, I cannot see how joint ownership 
could be organised in a territory where 
t h e  C O - o w n e r s  a r e  d i s p e r s e d  
geographically, merely by substituting 
majority rule for unanimity. The reality 
of residence which is fundamental in 
customary law must be taken into ac- 
count. It is not easily compatible with the 
Civil Code but it is a move in the direction 
of the desired goal: the creation of a truly 
rural  population. 
On the other hand, it is not possible to 
find an appropriate solution to problems 
pure ly  and  s imply by reverting to  
tradition. The Polynesians in this sphere 
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‘c > have not always behaved as they might 
have been expected. Everywhere, in- 
cluding the distant atolls, they aspire to 
t h e  c o m f o r t s  t h a t  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
civilisation can bring to their lives, though 
not necessarily adhering to all the values 
provided by such civilisation. It is not 
desirable to break the cohesion of groups 
of siblings who constitute the basic unit of 
society, particularly in the archipelagoes. 
But it,is not by basing this cohesion on the 
authority of the elders that the future 
smooth operation of the land system can 
be ensured. This authority, because it is 
so often accompanied by privileges, is 
more and more frequently contested by 
the younger people. 
In applying any new legislation, the 
responsible authorities should adopt a 
realistic attitude which takes into account 
the situation existing in the various ar- 
chipelagoes. It is urgent to find a solution 
to the problems posed by joint possession 
in the Society Islands and the western 
part  of the Tuamotus. The same does not 
always apply in the distant archipelagoes. 
In certain atolls of the eastern part of the 
Tuamotus, customary joint ownership is 
not yet a hindrance to the regeneration of 
coconut plantations. In Rurutu, joint 
ownership is not responsible for the aban- 
doning of the coconut and vanilla plan- 
tations. nor for the feeble extension of the 
new coffee plantations. In one place the 
increase in the number of wage-earners is 
the cause, in another the weak purchasing 
power of copra brings with it the risk of a 
rural exodus in the near future. At the 
m o m e n t ,  the improvement  of ru ra l  
economy depends to a greater extent on 
the effects of more extended technical 
assistance to farmers, on a reorganisation 
of inter-island transport, or on control of 
production prices, than on the reform of 
the land tenure system. Evolution and 
change a re  unavoidable and one must 
provide for their consequences by im- 
m e d i a t e l y  s e t t i n g  u p  a p p r o p r i a t e  
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legislation if serious disruption of the 
fragile socio-economic balance of rural 
societies is to be avoided. 
There should be similar reasoning in 
regard to land leases. To grant the non- 
owner farmer, working on joint-owned 
land, a legal status before settling the 
problems inherent in the ownership 
system. is putting the cart before the hor- 
se. However, in Tahiti, Moorea, and 
Raiatea, favourable conditions for setting 
up such a statute already exist. There are 
m a n y  unused  o r  under-worked in-  
dividually-owned properties for which the 
writing of leases poses no serious legal 
p r o b l e m s .  A n u m b e r  of p l a n t e r s ,  
stimulated by the proximity of an expan- 
ding urban market, are  committed to a 
path of change. The technical staff of the 
Department of Rural Economy can come 
in with maximum effectiveness. 
The government’s goals for agricultural 
d e v e l o p m e n t  w i l l  b e  a c h i e v e d  
in the short and medium term only if the 
agricultural potential of the land is deter- 
mined within the context of a Territorial 
development plan. Especially in the Wind- 
ward Islands, if the situation is left to it- 
self, agriculture will be driven from the 
coastal plains by residential development, 
pleasure parks and tourist amenities. In 
t h e  Leeward  Islands and especially 
Wuahine. the systematic purchase of joint 
ownership shares by foreigners who wish 
to become individual owners clearly 
shows that,  in the present situation, joint 
ownership does not always sufficiently en- 
sure  the  preservation of property for 
agricultural purposes. 
T h e  government’s goals will be 
a c h i e v e d  only if those involved in 
cultivation and stock-raising are allowed 
to carry out their farming in a reasonable 
manner, profiting from the fruits of their 
labour. This applies to non-owner farmers 
as much as to joint owners. In all of 
French Polynesia, regardless of the land 
tenure system, the responsibility for the 
I 
work is always left in the hands of in- 
dividuals: the basic cell for rural develop- 
ment, taking into account an evolution 
which has  been underway for some time, 
remains the elementary family unit. 
A certain number of steps to en- 
courage production, especially of a fiscal 
n a t u r e ,  will a lso have  to be taken. 
However ,  these provisions will have 
posi t ive resul ts  only , i f  land rights, 
especially in regards to joint ownership, 
a re  thoroughly reviewed. 
A review of land right 
“If one wants to reach a method of 
organisation for management of jointly 
held land which is rational and above all 
efficient and if, as I shall point out, one 
desires to  set up property taxation or 
organisations of t he  SAFER type, it 
seems indispensible to have initially a 
completed and closed list of the joint 
owners concerned . . .” (Calinaud, 1975-76, 
p.34). 
In order not to delay the launching of 
the government-‘s projected development 
operations indefinitely, I would like to 
propose that the verification procedures 
f o r  l a n d  r igh ts  b e  linked with the  
establishment or rather, in the majority 
of cases, with the revision of the land sur- 
vey. This should be done as a priority in 
the islands or the sectors where govern- 
ment has  concrete development projects. 
It is useless to survey the interior of 
islands which are  not or never have been 
used and therefore are of no economic in- 
terest. Neither can I see why one should 
proceed with the surveying of certain 
sparsely inhabited islands while a revision 
is imperative in certain of the high islands 
with rea l  possibilities for development. 
Finally, I would like to point out the 
existence of recent aerial photographs 
which a r e  available in the Territory and 
which would facilitate operations con- 
siderably. 
* I n  F r a n c e  SAFERS a r e  “Land 
1 
Development companies and rural  
organisations established to buy up 
land or agricultural estates which 
have been freely put on the market by 
their owners, as well as uncultivated 
land destined to be returned to their 
owners after eventually having been 
developed. 
In the communes and sections of com- 
munes which would be chosen, a jurist 
(not necessarily a magistrate but above 
all som eone familiar with the situation) 
and a land surveyor,  who would be 
assisted by two locally resident represen- 
tatives, could proceed with the inquiries 
necessary to obtain a deed of property 
and the corresponding parcel plans. This 
operation should be announced in advance 
through the usual channels, and non- 
residents with claims to put forward 
would be invited to make them on the spot 
or to have themselves represented. After 
a c e r t a i n  period, t he  ordinary civil 
jurisdiction would rest in the last resort 
on the validity of the property deeds. 
On the basis of established documents 
which should be regularly updated, a real 
estate index system could be organised. 
On these documents could be indicated all 
deeds bearing on the transmission of 
property.  The genealogies established 
during the investigations could also be an- 
nexed; a copy of the files would then be 
preserved at the main administrative cen- 
tre of the commune. 
. 
Property conservation 
By establishing in 1974 “protected 
agricultural zones”, the Territory has 
provided itself with the necessary tool for 
“ c o n s e r v a t i o n  or  ag r i cu l tu ra l  im-  
provement” of inherited land. But as the 
Social and Economic Committee pointed 
out in 1978, “four years after the creation 
of this legislation, only one agricultural 
zone has  been created on the motu of 
Huahine (and) another agricultural zone ‘ 




T h e  v a r i o u s  inqu i r i e s  and ad-  
ministrative procedures required to obtain 
this kind of classification ought therefore 
exists a spontaneous method of organising 
space (concentration of urban and tourist 
sectors,  localisation of latifundia and 
microfundia, distribution of the main land 
u t i l i s a t i o n  f o r m s ) ,  p e r f e c t l y  
distinguishable in aerial  photographs 
which would well facilitate this work. 
It is doubtful, as the French example 
shows, tha t  the creation of protected 
agricultural zones is an efficient weapon 
. against speculation. As Dumont (n.d., 
p.33) suggests, in order to “moderate the 
price increase on agricultural lands”, one 
could look into the creation (see note 2, p. 
52) of SAFERS so that, by adapting them 
to the local context, and by the use of 
public credits, land acquired could not 
only be reassigned but also, contrary to 
what is happening in France, be leased. 
To set up such a structure the survey 
would have  to be terminated and a statute 
adopted for the non-owner farmer. 
I to be simplified, if possible. There already 
- . The status  of the farmer 
A land reform essentially has two sets 
of provisions. The first relates to rural 
leases which are already being considered 
by the Territorial authorities. The second 
relates to  joint ownerships, still only- a 
proposal, which ought to be’ approved by 
the French  legislators. In view of the 
complexities of the problems involved, 
this is considered here in greater detail. 
The suggested system of rural leases 
provides for long leases (9 years) and 
their renewal, to allow the lessee the 
chance of reaping the fruits of his work 
and investment. It also provides for the 
right of pre-emption and the right to in- 
demnification on departure, each time the 
lessee has  contributed to the development 
of the property. This indemnification can 
be a n  encouragement to  reinvest in 
agriculture. 
\ 
It also provides a codification of ren- ’i, 
tal fees (in share-cropping, “the, part 
coming to the lessor . . . cannot be higher 
than one third of all the products sold”), 
allowing each party to make a legitimate 
p r o f i t  o u t  of h i s  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  
agricultural activity. 
Such provisions, which at the present 
time especially- in the Society archipelago 
concern individual ownershis more than 
joint ownership, could be applied to the 
whole territory immediately solutions can 
be found to the problems posed by joint 
owners hip. 
For  some time now, the sole policy of 
the administration and jurists has been to 
consider that Co-owamshould be-allowed 
a c c e s s  t o  individual  ownership by 
facilitating distribution. It would be better 
to make a change. 
However, this does not mean that ac- 
cession to individual ownership should 
always be discouraged, especially, for 
example, in the case of the large estates, 
owned by demis, where the parcelling 
following legal distribution does not com- 
promise the existence or prohibit the set- 
ting up of viable agricultural operations. 
However, in the traditional world and 
especially in distant archipelagoes, joint 
possessions should be obtained and made 
functional since they are a factor fun- 
damen ta l  to  social stability and .the 
preservation of property. Contrary to 
what took place in rural leases when the 
Civil Code was used, it will not always be 
possible to do this by adapting French 
legislation to local reality, but customary 
law, properly adapted, can be used as a 
legal instrument in the service of develop- 
ment. 
In order to do this, it is necessary to 
acknowledge the right of the co-owner to 
his plantations, even and especially if this 
concerns perennial cultivations, and to 
make this right trnasmissible to his heirs. 
It should be noted that local jurisprudence 
(Calinaud 1, has taken a considerable step 
.- 
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in this direction by assimilating this fun- 
damental element of customary law with 
c e r t a i n  usages  of pre-revolutionary 
France (“surface rights”) which the Civil 
,Code never abolished. For more security, 
a s t a t u t e  should be adopted by- the  
legisla ture. 
Customary distributions should be 
legalised wherever they exist among 
socially coherent groups of relatives 
(restricted or extended opu hoe). and joint 
ownership by more extended groups 
should’ be discouraged. 
A “sys t em of consultation and 
decision” (the legal form of which is to be 
determined) -should be created which, in 
substituting itself for a birthright subject 
to challenge, would have a triple function: 
a s s i g n i n g ,  l a n d s  t o  b e  developed,  
renewing exhausted plantations, and set- 
tling dispute initially privately. 
The existence and efficiency of this 
s t r u c t u r e  would be  subjec t  t o  the  
following conditions’. A deed of con- 
stitution ought to be made by some of the 
Co-owners representing perhaps “half of 
the property rights”, and opposable by 
the other Co-owners. The managerial cen- 
tre would be established in the section of 
the commune where the titleholders have 
the most land. 
T h e  f o r m a l i t i e s  f o r  convening 
m e  e t i n  g s hav ing  b e  e n  establ ished,  
decisions would be made by the majority 
of those present, those opposing being 
able to  bring the dispute before an 
itinerant judge or a communal jurisdic- 
tion which would rule on the matter in the 
last  resor t .  In a terri tory where kin 
groups a re  geographically highly disper- 
sed, such an arrangement is necessary if 
decisions made are to be effective, 
. 
Steps to encourage production 
I n  a t e r r i t o r y  w h e r e  u s e f u l  
agricultural areas are limited and most 
property is under-worked, two categories 
of measures to encourage development 
could be planned. The first would be to 
require owners of undeveloped land or 
land--left -abandoned- for more than five 
years either to develop it or to lease it 
within a period of two years. . 
The second would be fiscal. A tax’on 
undeveloped rural properties has existed 
in the Territory .since 1953, but it has 
never been collected. The State Council, ‘ 
in a ruling on an appeal brought by one of 
the first persons so taxed, considered that 
this tax -contained a certain number of 
technical imperfections which were an ob- 
stacle to its being applied. It would be 
desirable to remedy these imperfections. 
A precise survey is not necessary to 
localise the latifundia which have not 
been developed. Dumont (n.d., p. 29) has 
shown that a “land tax . . . is a factor 
essential to agricultural development . . . 
the primary basis for the take-off of an 
autonomous,  self-supporting develop- 
ment,” but this presumes close technical 
surveillance, public business organisations 
supporting a network of cooperatives, and 
high prices which already exist in French 
Polynesia. The collection of a land tax 
would require a revision of the cadastral 
plan. 
Another form of taxation, which 
would discourage land speculation and be 
easy to determine, could ultimately be 
charged on profits made on the sale of 
plots of land. 
These are some of the steps which, if 
adopted,  could contribute to  an im- 
provement of local agriculture, on con- 
dition of course as Calinaud has pointed 
out (1976, p- 6.51, that ‘‘concrete develop- 
ment projects” are available to begin 
with. It is hardly sufficient merely to 
change the judicial context in order to 
modify the socio-economic situation. 
. 
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Price per s q .  metre for undeveloped land in: 
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Year No. of Av. pkice Min. 
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116 
26 <1 52 5 
1959 
.1 16 
129 2 59 6 
1960 
3 
202 5 62 8 
1961 
112 
49 6 3 
1962 
103 
257 6 79 8 
1963 
5 
368 2 106 1964 17 
24 
700 1965 12 301 14 
243 700 - 6 '  




729 2 1968 69 
- 40 
47 327 6 1,256 
1969 
155 
52 427 8 1,550 
1970' 
650 5 
800 1931 57 385 69 
670 50 
1972 69 575 64 1,519 
1973 120 518 28 1,450 
502 54 
1974 185 566 48 1,250 
238 10 
1975 101 619 42 2,985 
1,313 41 2,593 
1976 57 729 8 2,638 
1977 44 745 44 1,859 
AV. price Min. Max. No. of Av. price  b. 
transfers a 5 price a 5  price price transfers 
- - 1 
1 
- - 44 
131 7 63 
123 3 76 
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1967 34 201 10 
- 
353 
- - - - - 
87 183 . 
249 
140 
1,125 - '"àfers during only 6 month 
Appendix III: Real estate speculation In both communes of the south coast of Tahltl from 1959 to 1977. 
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Swamp ta ro  
Dry t a ro  
Potatoes 
Vegetables 
C + Ca 
C + Mu 
C + Ca + Mu 
C + Mu + taro 
C + M u  + Ma 
C + M u  
Taro + L 
Taro -t P + L 









1 Direct development Ca Coffee 






Ma Manioc (cassava) 
+ 
, 
Indicates a person or group employs several forms of land use 
Indicates a person or group exercises one. or more forms of land use in a complex tenure 
I 
(Source: F. Ravault, 1977a).  
Appendix IV: Papeari: types of agricultural land use in individual properties, 1968 
1 
.cr 
* .  
*, (Source: F. Ravault, 1977a) 
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